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Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board 
Martha Minow∗ 
When Representative Diane Wilkerson stood at the recent 
Massachusetts constitutional convention, she spoke of growing up in 
Arkansas after the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.1 Fighting tears, she recalled how the public hospital 
refused to admit her mother to deliver her children. She said, “I know 
the pain of being less than equal and I cannot and will not impose that 
status on anyone else. . . . I was but one generation removed from an 
existence in slavery. I could not in good conscience ever vote to send 
anyone to that place from which my family fled.”2  
About what pending issue was she speaking? She cast her vote 
against proposals to ban same-sex marriage in the Massachusetts 
constitution. Proposals to create a separate civil union status would 
offer legal and social benefits to these couples but excluding them 
from marriage would erect a “separate but equal”3 regime that would 
not grant real equality. This argument is one perhaps surprising 
legacy of Brown v. Board. The analogy to Brown has been ringing 
ever since the high court of Massachusetts found the marriage law 
excluding same-sex couples to violate the state constitution.4 The 
Court initially did not say whether civil unions would be satisfactory 
or instead whether marriage itself had to become available to meet 
the state constitution’s equality guaranty. The debate has registered in 
the public imagination that the struggle for gay rights is indeed the 
civil rights struggle of our day. A key legacy of Brown is that people 
 ∗ William Henry Bloomberg Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Another version 
of this essay will appear in LEGACIES OF BROWN: MULTIRACIAL EQUITY IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION (Dorinda J. Carter et al. eds., 2004) (forthcoming). 
 1. 349 U.S. 294 (1955), supplementing 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. Frank Phillips & Raphael Lewis, Two Marriage Amendments Fail, Lawmakers to 
Reconvene Today, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 2004, at A1, B7. 
 3. Brown, 347 U.S. at 491 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
 4. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Opinions of the 
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).  
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now convinced of its rightness must ask themselves what current 
struggle will look similarly so right fifty years hence. 
Perhaps the most powerful legacy of Brown v. Board is this: 
opponents in varied political battles fifty years later each claim ties to 
the decision and its meaning. So although the analogy between 
Brown and same-sex marriage has divided Black clergy, each side 
vies to inherit the civil rights heritage.5 President George W. Bush 
invoked Brown in opposing race-conscious college admission 
practices.6 The success of Brown in reshaping the moral landscape 
has been so profound that I fear we do not fully comprehend its 
legacies—and may fail to attend sufficiently to continuing 
controversy and complexities in its wake.7 I will talk today about 
legacies that may not be so obvious—after first considering how to 
understand what Brown did and did not accomplish directly. 
I. BROWN AND RACIAL DESEGREGATION IN SCHOOLS 
The most famous decision of the United States Supreme Court, 
Brown v. Board of Education stands both as the “landmark”8 emblem 
of social justice and the symbol of the limitations of court-led social 
reform. The Court’s words eliminated racial segregation as an 
acceptable social practice in domains governed by the Constitution’s 
equal protection clause, but the Court-supervised remedial process 
produced protracted and sometimes violent conflicts over the 
succeeding decades. Since the 1980s, judicial withdrawal from school 
desegregation suits and patterns of residential segregation have 
contributed to increasing racial resegregation in public schools in the 
 5. See Michael Paulson, Black Clergy Rejection Stirs Gay Marriage Backers, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2004, at B1.  
 6. See Ralph Reed, History Shows GOP on Side of Civil Rights, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Dec. 19, 2002, at 25A. 
 7. Some scholars have made careers in debating whether the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education itself deserves credit for the civil rights revolution. See 
GERALD ROSENBERG, HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE (1993). In 
the years between 1954 and the adoption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, southern whites used 
harassment, intimidation, and outright resistance to any movement toward school 
desegregation. I do not here mean to resolve that debate and instead take the confluence of 
social movement, court action, and legislative action surrounding Brown as a whole. 
 8. A Lexis search of law review articles produced 508 such references (brown /2 board 
/9 landmark) (July 6, 2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/3
p 11 Minnow book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board 13 
 
 
 
United States.9 Many white students have little or no interaction with 
students of other races due to residential isolation.10 White families 
who have options avoid racially mixed schools.11 Large urban 
districts, in which seventy percent of the students are non-white and 
over half are poor or near poor, face higher levels of violence, 
disruption, dropouts and lower test scores than suburban schools.12 
The gap in achievement when students are compared by race persists 
across all age groups, even when controlled for economic class. Thus, 
speaking of Brown today means speaking both of landmark social 
change and obdurate racialized practices. This makes the fiftieth 
anniversary of the decision a complex moment for simultaneous 
celebration and critique.13 
 9. One source states: “In many districts where court-ordered desegregation was ended in 
the past decade, there has been a major increase in segregation. The courts assumed that the 
forces that produced segregation and inequality had been cured. This report shows they have 
not been.” GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARVARD UNIV., BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM 
OR PLESSY’S NIGHTMARE? 2 (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/ 
research/reseg04/brown50.pdf. 
Although American public schools are now only sixty percent white nationwide and 
nearly one-fourth of U.S. students are in states with a majority of nonwhite students, 
most white students have little contact with minority students except in the South and 
Southwest. . . . The vast majority of intensely segregated minority schools face 
conditions of concentrated poverty, which are powerfully related to unequal 
educational opportunity. Students in segregated minority schools can expect to face 
conditions that students in the very large number of segregated white schools seldom 
experience. Latinos confront very serious levels of segregation by race. 
The Civil Rights Project, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare? (Jan. 17, 2004), 
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/news/pressreleases/brown04.php (last 
visited June 17, 2004). 
 10. Id. at 16 (noting Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, 
Segregating Schools: The Retreat from School Desegregation in the South, 1990–2000, 81 N.C. 
L. REV. 1563 (2003)). 
 11. Id. at 4 (describing both selections of private schools and movement to white 
suburbs).  
 12. JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 25 (2003).  
 13. For example, the University of Illinois announced its plans for celebration with two 
sharply contrasting sentences. See The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Brown vs 
Board of Education Jubilee Commemoration, at http://www.oc.uiuc.edu/brown (last visited 
July 7, 2004): “On May 17, 1954, America was changed forever when the United States 
Supreme Court ruled unanimously to outlaw racial segregation in the nation's public schools;” 
and in contrast, “That landmark decision in favor of simple social justice set the country on a 
course of debate, dissent, and change that continues today.” See id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Celebration and critique: this is reminiscent of Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s view during the Bicentennial celebrations of the U.S. 
Constitution.14 He warned of a complacent belief that such a 
celebration could engender.15 And he emphasized that the founding 
document was flawed from the start, riddled with the contradiction 
between preserving slavery and committing to freedom and equality 
for “We, the People.”16 To be fair, the specific notion of an original 
flaw resonates not so much with the 1954 Brown I decision, declaring 
racial separation “inherently unequal.”17 Instead, it fits the Court’s 
1955 “all deliberate speed” language in its Brown II opinion about 
the timing for remedying the intentionally segregated schools.18 Like 
the Clause in the original constitution counting slaves as three fifths 
of a person for apportionment purposes and protecting the property 
rights of slaveholders, “all deliberate speed” was the compromise 
offered by a Court preoccupied with white resistance to racial 
equality. The dramatic moment of resistance in Little Rock, when 
Governor Faubus brought out the Arkansas National Guard to 
prevent nine Black students from enrolling in the Central High 
School, led a reluctant President Eisenhower to send in national 
troops.19 The Supreme Court affirmed this federal power to 
implement Brown, but Southern resistance persisted in almost every 
school district.20 Many people viewed the “all deliberate speed” 
language of Brown II as a signal that encouraged both noncompliance 
 14. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 18. See 347 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 19. ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 192 (2003). 
 20. Id. at 193–94. 
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with, and even resistance to, desegregation. Hence, we have the 
continuing national failure to achieve racial justice.21  
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s leadership of a movement of civil 
disobedience, three hundred thousand people in the 1963 March on 
Washington, and President Lyndon Johnson’s political skills 
following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy each 
crucially contributed to the political and social struggles producing 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For the first time, we had serious 
federal enforcement of Brown. That law not only authorized the 
Department of Justice to enforce Brown through litigation, but also to 
withhold federal funds from school systems that discriminated 
against African-Americans. We will never know what would have 
happened if instead the phrase was “full speed ahead,” but the phrase 
marks a fault line lying between the two Brown opinions. The 
continuing failure to realize the vision of Brown seems persistently 
linked to the white resistance that fault line represents. 
Justice Marshall’s warning about the complacency of celebration 
remains relevant, though, even to the first Brown decision. For if 
Brown contained no internal flaw itself, it bequeathed a legacy of 
complexity about precisely what is equality. What is the normative 
vision of a just and equal society? Is separate always inherently 
unequal? Among the memorable ideas in the Supreme Court’s 
landmark opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, these two stand 
out: 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken 
to provide it, is a right that must be made available to all on 
equal terms.22 
 21. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 10–11 (2004). 
 22. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1995). 
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And: 
We conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine 
of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.23 
In the context of intentional and invidious racial segregation, these 
two ideas seem obviously compatible. The way to produce equal 
opportunity in education would be to end racial segregation; if 
separation is inherently unequal, then equality requires its ending. 
Yet even in this context, over time, it has become unclear whether 
equal opportunity demands simply ending official assignment of 
students to different schools based on their race or also demands 
integration in the same school—in the same classrooms—of students 
with different racial and ethnic identities. Denise Morgan put the 
point sharply: “Attending predominantly Black schools can be 
harmful to Black children because those schools tend to be 
educationally inferior, not because Black children are inferior, or 
because access to white children is inherently positive.”24 Did Brown 
find racially separate education inherently unequal because it tended 
to be educationally inferior or because it is always inferior unless 
racially integrated? Does segregation inherently convey the stamp of 
hierarchy? Or is its inherent limitation the deprivation of vital social 
interactions across group identities? Whatever the moral or empirical 
answer, the legal answer is clear. Racially segregated education is 
permitted if it does not directly or recently stem from intentional 
governmental action. 
The Supreme Court has allowed the termination of judicially 
supervised integration plans when the “vestiges” of official racial 
segregation seem remote, even in the face of resegregation through 
housing patterns. As a result, the percentage of Black students 
attending schools where the majority of other students are children of 
color has increased across the country over the past decade.25 This 
reversed the trend from the prior decade when courts monitored 
 23. Id. at 495. 
 24. Denise C. Morgan, What is Left to Argue in Desegregation Law?: The Right to 
Minimally Adequate Education, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 99, 106 (1991).  
 25. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 9, at 20 tbl.8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/3
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school assignments. The resegregation does not stem from decisions 
by school officials, but patterns of housing and jobs that in turn 
reflect a mix of private preferences and subtle discrimination.26 White 
families with financial means prefer predominantly white 
communities and white schools, which they associate with better 
opportunities for their children.27 Families of color face not only 
economic barriers but also direct discrimination in the mortgage and 
housing markets.28 The contemporary litigation under state 
constitutions and related state legislative efforts to promote 
“adequate” education represents serious efforts to improve instruction 
and student performance with requisite investment in schooling, but 
without seeking racial integration of the student body.29 
Is racial integration the measure of racial justice? Richard 
Kallenberg recently surveyed national attitudes and asserted that 
there is a consensus that integrated schools seem like a good idea but 
“we shouldn’t do anything to promote them.”30 Justice Clarence 
Thomas voiced the views of many, even within the African-American 
community, who are insulted by the suggestion that educational 
 26. HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 12, at 45. 
 27. Id. 
 28. One detailed study of the Boston area explores the complex interaction among these 
factors. DAVID J. HARRIS, FAIR HOUS. CTR. OF GREATER BOSTON, & NANCY MCARDLE, 
HARVARD UNIV., MORE THAN MONEY: THE SPATIAL MISMATCH BETWEEN WHERE 
HOMEOWNERS OF COLOR IN METRO BOSTON CAN AFFORD TO LIVE AND WHERE THEY 
ACTUALLY RESIDE (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/ 
metro/residential_choice.php (last visited June 17, 2004). 
 29. By 2002, forty-three suits generated nineteen decisions striking down school-finance 
schemes under the relevant state constitutions. See Liz Kramer, Achieving Equitable Education 
Through the Courts: A Comparative Analysis of Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2002); see 
also Stewart G. Pollock, School Finance in the Courts, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 133 (1998) 
(summarizing developments). For a helpful overview of recent suits, see Molly McUsic, The 
Law’s Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance 
Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL 
EQUITY 88 (Jay B. Heubert ed., 1999) [hereinafter LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM], and generally 
William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The 
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994). See also Patricia F. First & 
Barbara M. DeLuca, The Meaning of Educational Adequacy: The Confusion of DeRolph, 32 
J.L. & EDUC. 185 (2003) (Ohio litigation); Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics 
of Reform: Lessons from School Finance Litigation in Kentucky, 1984–1995, 26 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 631 (2001); James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation and School Finance Litigation, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 529 (1999) (Connecticut). 
 30. RICHARD KALLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS 
THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 42 (2001).  
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excellence cannot occur in an entirely or predominantly Black or 
Hispanic school. Finding students of color in schools largely with 
other students of color, in this view, is not itself a betrayal of the 
promise of Brown, he maintains. Such a betrayal comes instead in 
low expectations and low achievement levels among such students.  
A legacy of Brown is an apparently enduring debate over racial 
integration. Equal opportunity is the aspiration, if not the given. But 
does equal opportunity mean ending the symbolic and practical 
subordination of segregation and paying attention to race or does it 
mean creating a color-blind society and halting the explicit use of 
race? Our national ambivalence on these issues is well captured in the 
Supreme Court’s recent affirmative action decision. The Court 
extended approval for diversity rationales for racially conscious 
admissions to universities and colleges, but Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion tethered this approval to an expectation that attention to race 
and ethnicity would no longer be necessary, and perhaps no longer 
acceptable, twenty-five years from now.31 
II. IN SCHOOLS, OUTSIDE OF RACE 
Let’s consider the legacies of Brown in schools, but beyond the 
context of race. I suggest that Brown enshrined equal opportunity as 
the aspiration, if not the given, for students whose primary language 
is not English, for students who are immigrants, for girls, for students 
with disabilities, for gay or lesbian or transgendered students, and for 
religious students. The racial justice initiative expanded to include all 
these students so that today, American public schools are preoccupied 
with the aspiration of equality and the language of inclusion. Fifty 
years after Brown, equality is the drone string, the underlying tone of 
school missions and evaluation. Yet no less pervasive is the struggle 
over realizing equality through integrated or separate settings, and it 
is to the permutations I now turn. As we will see, these ongoing 
debates point increasingly to educational expertise to answer a 
question implicit, but not central to, Brown v. Board of Education: 
what kinds of instruction actually promote equal opportunities for all 
children? 
 31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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A. Language 
Brown, the social movement behind it, and the strategy of law 
reform leading up to it inspired people concerned with the exclusion 
and inequality experienced by others besides African-Americans, and 
schools remained a central focus.32 For cloudy reasons, the 1964 
Civil Rights Act itself included national origin in its scope of 
protection. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
exercised its authority under the Act to issue guidelines governing 
bilingual education and students learning English. The Supreme 
Court in 1974 upheld such regulations and found the San Francisco 
school district in violation because it failed to develop tailored 
programs for Chinese-speaking students.33 Here, the act of including 
the Chinese-speaking students in the mainstream classroom with no 
accommodation amounted to discrimination forbidden on the basis of 
national origin to any school district receiving federal financial 
assistance because the Chinese-speaking students received fewer 
benefits than the English-speaking majority.34 Besides representing a 
key decision to use impact rather than intention as the measure of 
illicit discrimination, the decision exposed a new version of the 
tension between integration and separate treatment.35  
Congress soon responded with the Equal Education Opportunities 
Act of 1974, requiring recipient schools “to take appropriate action to 
overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its 
students in its instructional programs.”36 With the Bilingual 
Education Act of 1974, Congress also extended some degree of 
funding to schools offering bilingual education.37 As court challenges 
pressed for greater bilingual education programming, some courts 
agreed and others deferred to local school boards.38 One influential 
 32. See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary 
Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571 (1995). 
 33. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
 34. Id.  
 35. For my earlier treatment of this issue, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990). 
 36. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 204(f), 88 Stat. 484, 515 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) 
(2000)). 
 37. 20 U.S.C. § 880(b) (1976). 
 38. William Ryan, Note, The Unz Initiatives and the Abolition of Bilingual Education, 43 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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decision declined to require bilingual education as the means for 
ensuring equal educational opportunity.39 Eliciting both strong 
support and strong opposition, such programs when well run afford 
real access to the curriculum for students learning English. But they 
also risk segregating students learning English from other students 
and undermining racial desegregation plans. Amid competing 
scholarly assessments of the effectiveness of varied kinds of bilingual 
programs with immersion in English-speaking classrooms,40 the 
evidence strongly suggests that the quality of the teachers is a more 
significant factor in student achievement than the choice between 
bilingual instruction and English immersion.41 Does the centrality of 
teaching quality support continuing experiments with bilingual 
education on the grounds that it has never been given a fair chance, or 
will separate instruction never be equal, practically or symbolically?42  
Intense political pressures on both sides of the debate over 
bilingual education affect the quality and perception of evaluation 
efforts and the movement for legal bans on bilingual education. A 
California entrepreneur, Ron Unz, successfully crafted, financed, and 
pushed for the passage of an initiative to eliminate bilingual 
education first in that state and then in Arizona and Massachusetts.43 
Courts rejecting these bans on bilingual education rely on deference 
to educational expertise. So do courts that resist arguments for 
B.C. L. REV. 487 (2002).  
 39. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) (directing that school districts 
be evaluated in terms of adoption and implementation of a pedagogically sound approach for 
meeting the needs of limited English proficiency students). 
 40. See Marcelo Suarez-Orozco et al., Cultural, Educational, and Legal Perspectives on 
Immigration: Implications for School Reform, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 29, at 
190–91 (discussing the debate over whether proficiency in English requires up to six years to 
acquire); Charu A. Chandra Sekhar, Comment, The Bay State Buries Bilingualism: Advocacy 
Lessons From Bilingual Education’s Recent Defeat in Massachusetts, 24 CHICANO-LATINO L. 
REV. 43 (2003); Lisa Ellern, Note, Proposition 227: The Difficulty of Insuring [sic] English 
Language Learners’ Rights, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1999); Christine H. Rossell & 
Keith Baker, The Educational Effectiveness of Bilingual Education, 30 RES. IN THE TEACHING 
OF ENG. 7 (1996). 
 41. See Thomas F. Felton, Comment, Sink or Swim? The State of Bilingual Education in 
the Wake of California Proposition 227, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 843 (1999).  
 42. Both options may remain inadequate due to other factors—such as the economic class 
of the affected students and neighborhoods.  
 43. Chandra Sekhar, supra note 40. California still allows parents to elect either bilingual 
education or immersion under certain circumstances. 
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judicially imposed bilingual education.44 No one suggests a goal 
other than integration, eventually, but many people still urge short-
term separate instruction to promote acquisition of language, to 
maintain learning in other subjects while the student learns English, 
and to support positive experiences in school that respect the child’s 
heritage. Because many bilingual programs have not achieved these 
short-term goals and because students often remain in separate 
classes for years, we must consider how these programs really work, 
rather than focus only upon their aspirations. 
B. Gender  
No less controversial has been the treatment of gender, and here 
again combining overt commitment to equal opportunity with intense 
disagreement over integration compared with separate instructional 
settings. Good, though not undisputed, authority suggests that “sex” 
made its way into the employment section of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act (Title VII) only as a ploy to defeat its passage.45 Whatever the 
truth of that matter, deliberate argument and advocacy overcame 
strong opposition to produce a commitment to gender equality in the 
1972 Education Amendments that produced Title IX.46 Yet the 
analogy between race and gender has always been disputed, 
especially around the issue of whether separate can ever be equal.47 
Partly because historically the ideology surrounding gender accorded 
women, or at least white privileged women, a special place in home 
and family as a separate sphere, the inclusion of women in male 
settings has at times seemed to involve a loss of privilege or 
 44. Compare Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981), with Valeria G. v. 
Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
 45. BARBARA WHALEN & CHARLES WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 233–34 (1985); see also 110 CONG. REC. 2581 
(1964) (statement of Rep. Edith Green) (suggesting that Rep. Howard W. Smith proposed to 
insert “sex” to prevent the passage of Title VII); but see Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title 
VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 165 (1991); 
Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of 
Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997). 
 46. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(2) (2000).  
 47. For a thoughtful treatment of this analogy, see Christine Littleton, Reconstructing 
Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987).  
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protection.48 This has contributed to the judicial fight over the proper 
method for analyzing constitutional challenges to gender-based 
distinctions.49 The analogy to Brown has inspired women’s rights 
advocates to challenge single-sex education, with mixed results and 
with increasing debate among advocates about what to seek. 
The Supreme Court rejected single-sex education in nursing, a 
traditional women’s field,50 and in military training, a field from 
which women historically were excluded.51 Yet the Supreme Court 
has not rejected single-sex public schools where enrollment is 
voluntary and the quality is “substantially equal” to other schools. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in the 
leading case, Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,52 
distinguished race and gender for purposes of separate education by 
asserting that real differences remain by gender but not by race, and 
by emphasizing the value of local control and family choice.53 The 
same situation produced a later decision allowing entrance for girls in 
an all-boys school while preserving the all-girls schools through a 
combination of “tradition, informal district policy, and success in 
warding off the handful of boys who express interest.”54 
Compensatory rationales for separate instruction for girls may still be 
defensible.55 Plausible rationales for single-sex education could 
 48. See id.; Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional 
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 876 (1971); Martha Minow, Rights of 
One’s Own, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1084 (1985) (reviewing Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s views). 
 49. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (requiring important objectives behind 
gender distinctions) with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (requiring an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for sex-based distinctions); Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (same); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (accepting 
differential treatment of men and women in the military context); Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of 
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (asking whether men and women are similarly situated in 
relation to the statutory rape law).  
 50. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 733.  
 51. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 558. 
 52. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff’d by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Mary B.W. Tabor, Planners of a New Public School for Girls Look to Two Other 
Cities, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1996, at B2, quoted in ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, 
DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING 127 (2003).  
 55. So argues Denise Morgan, who revisited the early writings of Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, surely the architect of modern gender-equality jurisprudence. Denise C. Morgan, 
Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex Equality: The Young Women’s Leadership 
School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95, 104 (1997) (analyzing Ruth Bader 
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include compensating for inadequate opportunities in the past, 
improving educational outcomes and diversifying school choice.56 
Some teachers and experts suggest that given societal expectations 
and pressures, girls perform better in all-girls schools or all-girls 
mathematics classes.  
The most recent word by the Supreme Court is Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion rejecting exclusion of women from the Virginia Military 
Academy. The decision itself leaves room for single-sex instruction 
where justifiable as “exceedingly persuasive” in terms of an 
important government interest that is substantially related to that 
purpose.57 Especially because Virginia offered a patently inferior 
alternative to the women excluded from the Virginia Military 
Academy, the Court did not need to resolve whether single-sex 
education could ever be equal. That general question certainly 
remains open for single-sex programs premised on remedial and 
compensatory rationales. 
In this vein, sometimes to their own surprise, some feminists have 
defended the Young Women’s Leadership School in Harlem and 
other single-sex educational experiments while others challenge them 
in court.58 Empirical research on student achievement presents a 
mixed picture, with different gender gaps running to the advantage of 
both boys and girls. These gaps do not, however, approach the divide 
in school performance between economically advantaged and 
disadvantaged students.59 These very patterns motivated the plan for 
all-male schools in Detroit and Milwaukee addressing the situation of 
urban African-American boys, but under pressure and in the face of a 
lawsuit, the schools became co-ed.60 Single sex education may have 
Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 4 WOMEN’S RTS. L. RPTR. 
143 (1978)). 
 56. See Kimberly Jenkins, An Analytical Framework for Public Single-Sex Elementary 
and Secondary Schools (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 57. Id. at 531. 
 58. Compare Morgan, supra note 55 (supporter), with Fred Kaplan, Storm Gathers Over 
School in Flower, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1998, at A1 (describing lawsuit by National 
Organization for Women and New York Civil Liberties Union claiming the school violates 
Title IX). For a thoughtful treatment of the suit and its underlying issues, see SALOMONE, supra 
note 54, at 1–25, 61–63.  
 59. SALOMONE, supra note 54, at 114–15; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., 
GENDER GAPS: HOW SCHOOLS STILL FAIL OUR CHILDREN (1998).  
 60. SALOMONE, supra note 54, at 133–40. 
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seemed less justifiable for boys given the historical status and 
resource differences in educational opportunities for boys and girls. 
But symmetrical treatment, permitting both kinds of single-sex 
education, may emerge. Judges may find that permitting all-girls but 
not all-boys schools awkward, or difficult to justify or put in practice. 
Further, recent research indicates academic vulnerability for boys.61 
To complicate matters, research suggests that all-male environments 
may actually hinder the achievement of white boys, but improve the 
achievement of Black and Hispanic boys.62  
Congressional efforts to support single-sex education experiments 
faced strong opposition in the 1990s.63 The current Department of 
Education signaled in May 2002 an intention to permit experiments 
with single-sex classrooms and schools with public monetary 
support, but since has not acted on it.64 The legacy of Brown hovers 
over debates on single-sex education, and single-sex athletic teams, 
but equal opportunity is asserted both by those defending and those 
opposing separation by sex.65 To meet this goal, single-sex education 
should resist perpetuating stereotypes. Can the fact of single-sex 
education ever avoid implying some need for protection or some 
inferiority of girls? In any case, single-sex education looks most 
acceptable when it is available on a voluntary basis as one of many 
quality options; otherwise, it is too redolent of historical practices of 
exclusion.66 
 61. See WILLIAM S. POLLACK, REAL BOYS’ VOICES (2000); CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, 
THE WAR AGAINST BOYS 158–78 (2000). Although special concerns are rightly raised about 
Black boys’ academic risks, the data suggest problems across the color line. Cynthia Tucker, 
Pushy Parents are the Best Boost for Black Boys, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 25, 2003, at 10C.  
 62. Morgan, supra note 55, at 119 n.81 (discussing studies). 
 63. Id. at 139–40. 
 64. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,098 (May 8, 2002) (notice of intent to regulate).  
 65. On athletics, some courts have entertained arguments that girls need to be protected 
from the risks of injury in male contact sports. See, e.g., Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 
570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983). Federal law leaves this as a local question. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 106.41(b) (2000). However, the courts are tending to allow girls to try out for competitive, 
contact sports. See Barnett v. Tex. Wrestling Ass’n, 16 F. Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Tex. 1998); 
Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996). Yet the courts also accept exclusion of 
boys from girls’ teams in order to preserve opportunities for girls. See Clark v. Ariz. 
Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 66. See Jenkins, supra note 56, at 63 (discussing difficulties in ensuring truly voluntary 
choice where educators may press parents and students toward single-sex options).  
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C. Disability 
In 1967, Judge J. Skelly Wright applied Brown and its companion 
case, Bolling v. Sharpe, to the system of ability-level tracking used in 
the District of Columbia public schools and found the resulting racial 
composition violative of the constitution.67 Besides demonstrating 
how any one school can use tracking to segregate internally by race, 
the decision inspired advocates for children identified with 
disabilities to pursue desegregation and other equality strategies to 
end de jure exclusion of, and dismal programs for, students with 
disabilities from schooling. Prior to the 1970s, only seven states 
provided education for more than half of their children with 
disabilities.68 Those children with disabilities who did receive 
educational programming did so largely in classrooms or schools 
removed from their peers. Parents and educators pressed for both 
more funding and for experiments placing students with disabilities 
in regular educational settings.69 Two landmark decisions produced 
orders requiring free public educational programs for students with 
disabilities. The 1971 consent decree in Pennsylvania Association for 
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth70 specifically preferred 
placement in a regular public school classroom over a separate class 
for students with disabilities. A summary judgment in Mills v. Board 
of Education,71 in 1972, rejected the exclusion of children with 
disabilities from the District of Columbia schools and called for 
publicly supported education “suited to the [student’s] needs.” 
Following the decree in Mills, the school system held three hundred 
hearings in the first nineteen months.72 Congress relied on these court 
actions when it adopted in 1975 the Education for All Handicapped 
 67. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511–14 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The decision also 
criticized the segregation of class due to the use of neighborhood school assignments. 
 68. Jeffrey J. Zettel & Joseph Ballard, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975 (P.L. 94-142): Its History, Origins, and Concepts, in SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: 
ITS LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS 11, 12 (Joseph Ballard et al. eds., 1982).  
 69. Robert L. Hughes & Michael A. Rebell, Special Educational Inclusion and the 
Courts: A Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523 (1996). 
 70. 343 F. Supp. 279, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1972); 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
 71. 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 72. Patricia M. Wald, Whose Public Interest Is It Anyway? Advice for Altruistic Young 
Lawyers, 47 ME. L. REV. 3, 11 (1995). 
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Children Act, since renamed the Individuals with Disabilities in 
Education Act.73 This statute, and the Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments of 1973, shifted legal treatment of persons with 
disabilities to a framework of rights rather than support or care.74  
From the start, the federal law recognized the value of 
integration—triggered by the requirement that, to the maximum 
extent feasible, the school system place the child with disabilities in 
the “least restrictive environment,”75 known in this context as 
mainstreaming or inclusion. The law also requires the educational 
program and related services to be tailored to meet the needs of the 
individual child.76 The statutory scheme promotes identification of 
students who could well have gone undetected in the past and 
protects against faulty identification, which can produce stigma and 
misallocation of resources.77 The law offers participating states 
money in exchange for plans to ensure appropriate education and 
related services and administrative procedures for creating 
individualized education plans with parental participation and 
opportunities for review.78 At once an entitlement and an equality 
commitment, the special education law has become a major focus of 
attention for schools and parents and a basis for struggles over 
resources, balancing the interests of individual children and groups of 
children and assessing when equal opportunity calls for integration or 
when instead it calls for a specialized, separate instructional settings.  
Before the adoption of the law, nearly seventy percent of children 
with disabilities who received education did so in separate 
classrooms, or separate schools provided education and services.79 
With the law, and with the advocacy and related changes in 
educational philosophy it represents, by 1996 over seventy percent of 
 73. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–487 (2000). 
 74. Laura F. Rothstein, Reflections on Disabilities Discrimination Policy—25 Years, 22 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 148 (2000). 
 75. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2000). 
 76. See id.; 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1)(i) (2004).  
 77. Millions of students are currently identified as having a disability and there has been a 
thirty percent increase in such identifications over the past ten years. National Education 
Association, Special Education and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, at 
http://www.nea.org/specialed (last visited July 11, 2004). 
 78. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1414–15 (2000).  
 79. Hughes & Rebell, supra note 69, at 524. 
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students with disabilities spent at least part of their day in the regular 
classroom with other students.80 Nearly half, forty-seven percent, of 
students with disabilities now spend all their time in the mainstream 
classroom.81 Courts initially ordered mainstreaming only if shown to 
be beneficial, but over time judges began to read the statutory call for 
mainstreaming to “the maximum extent appropriate.”82 Some of this 
transformation grew from the interpretation and implementation of 
the federal statute and regulations by educators and the development 
of new instructional techniques that support inclusion of students 
with disabilities in regular classrooms. But the change also reflected 
intensive litigation efforts. Although a line of court decisions favor 
mainstreaming,83 courts, educators, parents, and scholars continue to 
disagree over precisely when integration is wise and when, instead, 
separate instruction can afford equality.  
In favor of inclusion are these considerations: (1) socializing with 
nondisabled peers offers real academic and non-academic benefits for 
 80. See id. (As of 1996, 34.9% of disabled children were placed in regular classroroms 
full-time, and 36.3% in part-time programs, 23.5% in separate classrooms, 3.9% in separate 
schools, 0.9% in residential facilities, and 0.5% in hospitals or visiting programs in the 
students’ homes.).  
 81. In 1998–99, the states reported that forty-seven percent of these students spent at least 
eighty percent of the school day in regular classrooms, which is a notable increase over the 
thirty-one percent of such students who did so in 1978. National Center for Education Statistics, 
Contexts of Elementary and Secondary Education: Inclusion of Students with Disabilities in 
Regular Classrooms, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2002/section4/indicator28.asp (last 
visited July 11, 2004). 
 82. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2000). 
 83. See Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 1005 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(mainstreaming should be tried, but an autistic child placed with aids in general classroom until 
disruptions proved excessive and child received no benefits in the class were proper 
considerations for the child’s removal); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 
F.3d 1398, 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming placement of child with moderate retardation in 
regular classroom with supplemental support); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of 
Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1993) (district’s duty to consider inclusion in 
regular class before exploring alternatives); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 698–
99 (11th Cir. 1991) (using a cost/benefit analysis, child with Down’s syndrome was 
appropriately mainstreamed); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1060–52 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (where possible, child to be mainstreamed with appropriate services); Martha M. 
McCarthy, Inclusion of Children with Disabilities: Is Required?, 95 EDUC. L. REP. 823 (1995) 
(discerning trend toward inclusion). For proposals to refine the trend toward inclusion with 
exceptions for students who are disruptive or not capable of benefiting academically from 
placement in the regular classroom, see Kathryn E. Crossley, Note, Inclusion: A New Addition 
to Remedy a History of Inadequate Conditions and Terms, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 239, 257–
59 (2000). 
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the student with disabilities, both in the present and in preparation for 
navigating life in the future;84 and (2) learning alongside students 
with disabilities also can benefit nondisabled students by enhancing 
their understanding of others, their patience and appreciation of the 
struggles of others, and their ability to see their classmates as 
individuals rather than embodiments of stigmatized categories.85 
Factors competing with the integration commitment are: (1) due to 
resource restrictions, confusion, and misguided worries about 
teaching the child differently from others, a child with disabilities 
may not receive tailored instruction or necessary support services 
while mainstreamed in the regular classroom; and (2) the nondisabled 
classmates risk interference with their education due to disruptions or 
distractions caused by the students with disabilities or by the 
disproportionate teacher attention required by those students.86 A 
separate line of contention, less immediately germane to the 
mainstreaming debate, concerns the allocation of financial and other 
resources, given that students with disabilities typically require more 
resources whether placed in the regular or special classrooms.87 Some 
may assume that mainstreaming will be cheaper, but when 
implemented with appropriate supplemental aids and supports, it may 
well be as costly as separate classrooms with specially trained 
teachers.  
Courts continue, in varying degrees, to grant deference to the 
expertise of school officials over placement of students with 
disabilities, but nonetheless recognize the law’s dual demand for 
appropriate placements and placements that, to the extent feasible, 
permit the child with disabilities to go to school alongside 
nondisabled peers.88 Yet the courts have disagreed over precisely 
 84. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216–17; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1047–48. 
 85. Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 
DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 656–57 (1995). 
 86. See Marissa L. Antoinette, Comment, Examining how the Inclusion of Disabled 
Students into the General Classroom May Affect Non-Disabled Classmates, 30 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 2039, 2057–58 (2003) (proposing a “three strikes” removal policy for a student who 
disrupts the regular classroom); Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, 
and the Disabled Student, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2000) (examining how the treatment of 
disruption and discipline poses problems for students). 
 87. See Wald, supra note 72, at 12. 
 88. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 n.4 (1982) (deference to educators while 
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how to combine deference to educators with the statutory preference 
for the least restrictive alternative, producing no single clear test for 
measuring state compliance with the “least restrictive environment” 
provision of the law.89 No simple test could work, however, given the 
variety of disabling conditions, competing views about the purposes 
of education and value of integration toward those purposes, and 
even shifting ideas about the capabilities of children with certain 
conditions. One commentator warns that the influence of Brown v. 
Board of Education contributes to a simplistic embrace of 
mainstreaming for all children.90 An inappropriate placement in the 
regular classroom does not afford equal educational opportunities if 
the student cannot gain benefits from it. Thus, for some students with 
serious mental impairments, learning “life skills” such as shopping 
for groceries or even dressing oneself are central, which makes the 
regular classroom a poor fit.91 Yet even the warning in this sentence 
echoes historic assumptions that students with physical disabilities 
could not learn and cautions against shielding from review the 
assignment of a disabled student to a separate classroom or program. 
At the same time, segregation or exclusion seems not to trouble 
parents, especially those of children with learning disabilities, who 
view the law as a way to obtain special help.92 This should serve as a 
reminder that integration is not the exclusive way to achieve equal 
opportunity; treating people the same who are different is not equal 
treatment.93 
Brown v. Board of Education provides the template for 
demanding both equal opportunity and integration for students with 
disabilities, and working out what that means for individual students 
will continue to require complex assessments, subject to review. It 
will also require careful treatment of students with disabilities under 
recognizing Congressional preference for mainstreaming); Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1213–14. 
 89. Therese Craparo, Note, Remembering the “Individuals” of the Individuals With 
Disabilities Education Act, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 503–05 (2003).  
 90. Id. at 524. 
 91. Id. at 523; see also Theresa Bryant, Drowning in the Mainstream: Integration of 
Children with Disabilities After Oberti v. Clementon School District, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 83, 
101–07 (1995) (urging consideration of costs and whether the child with disabilities can benefit 
from the mainstream classroom and whether the child disrupts that classroom).  
 92. Bryant, supra note 91, at 117 n.283. 
 93. See MINOW, supra note 35. 
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emerging regimes of mandatory state-wide assessments, scrutiny of 
the racial and gender disparities in special education labels and 
placements. Including students with disabilities in mandatory 
statewide assessment could be at least as crucial to equalizing 
educational opportunities as classroom integration. Teachers and 
administrators are more likely to become committed to improving the 
educational performance of these students in comparable domains 
with other students when these accountability measures are extended 
to them.94 Evidence of over-identification of disabling conditions by 
race and gender and resulting segregation that affects chiefly African-
American boys provides serious grounds for concern, and produces 
eerie echoes of Hobson v. Hanson’s finding that the District of 
Columbia tracking system amounted to illegal racial segregation.95 
Racial and gender disparities are clues to patterns of under-
identification of students in some categories of disability as well, a 
further complexity in realizing equality in this context.  
And then there is the enduring problem of quality of instruction. I 
have been struck by the ability of truly gifted teachers to teach 
heterogeneous classes that include students with disabilities. The 
same children may seem unteachable as a whole group to another 
teacher, who then may turn to the special education apparatus to 
identify some students and remove them or obtain a classroom aid or 
other assistance. It is far from clear that ordering either inclusion or 
separate instruction will improve quality for either strategy without 
more explicit direction and resources that necessarily increase the 
number of talented teachers and better prepares teachers of 
heterogeneous classes.  
 94. See Jane K. Babin, Adequate Special Education: Do California Schools Meet the 
Test?, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 282–85 (2000).  
 95. Daniel J. Losen & Christopher Edley, Jr., The Role of Law in Policing Abusive 
Disciplinary Practices: Why School Discipline is a Civil Rights Issue, in ZERO TOLERANCE: 
RESISTING THE DRIVE FOR PUNISHMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 230 (William Ayers et al. eds., 
2001); Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 
WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1250–54 (1995); see also Patrick Linehan, Guarding the Dumping Ground: 
Equal Protection, Title VII and Justifying the Use of Race in the Hiring of Special Educators, 
2001 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 179, 192 (2001) (recommending hiring special educators of color to 
reduce the overidentification of students of color). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/3
p 11 Minnow book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board 31 
 
 
D. Citizenship, Sexual Orientation, and Religion  
Echoing Brown, but perhaps in surprising ways, many students, 
parents, schools, and communities are occupied with equality in 
schools, treatment of noncitizen immigrants and students who 
identify with or explore lesbian, gay, or transsexual orientations. 
Perhaps even more surprising are the uses of equality arguments on 
behalf of religious students and religious schools. Each of these 
contexts confirm the dominance of an equality framework launched 
by Brown; each recapitulate, in different ways, debates over 
integration as the sole or best way to achieve equality.  
Immigrants and noncitizens: Noncitizen children have faced 
exclusion as well as segregation in schooling. Arguments for 
exclusion include claims that their parents have not contributed to 
support the schools and that free education will create an undesirable 
incentive for people to immigrate unlawfully. Arguments for 
inclusion echo Brown’s commitments to equal opportunity and 
recognition of the central importance of education to success in life. 
Beyond the normative claim of dignity of the person, many 
proponents of inclusion make the practical point that many, if not 
most, of these children will stay in this country and will contribute 
more economically, socially, and politically if they have received an 
education.  
After the Supreme Court in 1982 rejected the effort by Texas to 
deny a free public education to undocumented school-aged children,96 
California proceeded through a citizens’ initiative to exclude 
unlawful aliens from public schools and to enlist school districts in 
investigating the legal status of each child.97 A district court barred 
implementation of the initiative on the grounds that it interfered with 
federal immigration law.98 Governor Pete Wilson appealed the 
decision, but the next governor dropped the appeal and ended doubt 
about ending the exclusion of noncitizen children from the schools.99 
 
 96. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 97. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West). 
 98. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 99. See Terry McDermott, Some Are Embittered by Fate of Prop. 187, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
2, 1999, at A1. 
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Meanwhile, many communities have created “newcomer schools” 
which are separate school facilities for recent immigrants. Intended to 
provide a comfortable transitional environment, these schools include 
bilingual and bicultural education and address issues for older 
students who have not had much previous schooling or literacy 
instruction in any language.100 The school systems are especially 
worried about the probability that enrollment in regular schools will 
frustrate adolescent immigrant children and lead them to drop out. By 
design, these schools separate these immigrants from other students 
for at least a year, and sometimes longer, but do so in order to 
provide tailored instruction and a supportive environment. Yet how 
can such programs avoid stigmatizing the students? Do they provide 
inferior resources and instruction?  
The federal No Child Left Behind Act101 requires states to include 
new immigrants in state standardized performance assessments. This 
could raise curricular expectations, but also could lead to 
counterproductive experiences of failure, especially if the states fail 
to provide tests in the students’ native languages.102 Recently, the 
federal government announced that recent immigrants could be 
exempt from the English assessments during their first year in school 
in the United States and that schools did not have to include those 
scores in their overall results.103 These students would still be 
expected to take exams in mathematics, with help in their native 
language.104 A deputy superintendent in Massachusetts commented 
that the previous policy was punitive: “It’s a form of child abuse to 
require students to take this test when we know they’re going to 
fail.”105 Many school officials remain worried about the moment 
when English language learners must be counted within school-wide 
English assessments because their inclusion would distort what the 
 100. Deirdre Fernandes, Schools to Open Special Program: Newcomer’s Academy Will 
Help Hispanics with Language Barrier, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 22, 2003, at A1. 
 101. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). 
 102. See Robert A. Frahm, Big Test, No Hope: No Child Left Behind Offers No Break for 
Language Barrier, HARTFORD CURRENT, Oct. 19, 2003, at A1. 
 103. Jared Stearns & Suzanne Sataline, New Immigrants Get Break on MCAS Test, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2004, at B1. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at B4 (quoting Steven Mills, deputy school superintendent in Worcester). 
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schools actually are achieving, both with these students and with the 
students who already speak English. Under the No Child Left Behind 
Act, costly remedial efforts as well as stigmatizing sanctions attach to 
schools with low performance scores. Backlash against the law has 
led states to seriously consider opting out of the funding that attaches 
to the assessment obligations. 
Gay and lesbian students: The New York City public school 
system established the Harvey Milk High School in 1985 for gay and 
lesbian teenagers.106 Its goal was to create a supportive and safe place 
for students who faced violence or intimidation.107 When it expanded 
in the fall of 2003, from two classrooms with 50 students to eight 
classrooms with 170 students, the school triggered protests—
especially from conservative religious groups.108 Critics include gay 
rights supporters who oppose segregation and warn that the separate 
schooling fails to equip these students for the real world and fails to 
dismantle discrimination.109 One critic said, “[t]hrough long, painful 
years we reached a consensus that we couldn’t allow segregation. 
This is a short-term gain and we need to look at the long-term, larger 
issues.”110 A Michigan editorial took up the issue and also opposed 
the separate school:  
Advocates say that by having their own school, gays will feel 
more comfortable and won’t be subjected to the intimidation 
that many of them now face in public schools. That argument 
comes uncomfortably close to racial segregationists in the 
1950s and 1960s who insisted that black students did best 
when they were “among their own.”111 
Yet, advocates indicate that, due to harassment and violence, gay 
teens are much more likely to drop out or attempt suicide than other 
 
 106. It may also be a haven for students who are transgendered or perceived to be gay or 
lesbian. 
 107. See Katherine Zoepf, Protests Mar Opening of Expanded Harvey Milk School, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at B3. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Tania Branigan, Responding to a Need, or to Fear? Criticism Greets School for 
Gay Youth, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at A03. 
 110. Id. (quoting Bill Dobbs, lawyer and gay activist).  
 111. Editorial, Gay School Not Right Solution, BATTLE CREEK ENQ., Aug. 4, 2003, at 6A. 
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students, and they need a special school.112 Given evidence that 
calling someone “gay” remains a common insult among teens,113 
sorting out how best to assist students today while also addressing 
prejudice and cruelty aimed at lesbian and gay students will 
undoubtedly pose challenges for some time to come. A voluntary 
separate school along these lines may seem more acceptable in a 
large system, like New York’s, that includes citywide special schools 
in science, fashion, and other topics. As a result, the Harvey Milk 
School includes gay and lesbian students who enroll in the larger city 
project of magnet schools with special themes.114 Yet, it remains 
troubling to conceive as “voluntary” enrollment a student’s selection 
of a special school because he wants to escape harassment at the 
regular school. Whether separate instruction is equal seems less 
relevant than determining how to make integrated education safe. In 
the meantime, although some people object to any public school 
acknowledgment of the sexual orientations of students, the 
commitment to equal opportunity for gay and lesbian students 
animates most of the arguments on both sides of this issue. 
Religious students: Perhaps advocacy of educational opportunities 
for religious students is the least predictable legacy of Brown v. 
Board of Education. I admit, the influence is indirect and requires 
standing back from much of the explicit legal arguments to look at 
the broader context. Yet in both the context of public aid to religious 
schools and in the treatment of religion in public schools, concerns 
about equality have reframed preoccupations with separating church 
and state. A principal architect of this shift is Michael McConnell, 
long-time law professor and now appellate court judge, whose 
scholarship and advocacy argued against separate spheres of public 
and private—with religion relegated to the private—and instead 
argued for full and equal rights for religious individuals in the public 
sphere.115 It surely is no accident that McConnell also has written 
 
 112. Branigan, supra note 109, at A03 (quoting students and advocates). 
 113. See James Quinn, Editorial, Reactions to a “Gay School,” Student Briefing Page, 
NEWSDAY, Dec. 4, 2003, at A26. 
 114. Thanks to Susan Steinway for this observation. 
 115. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling 
Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in 
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extensively on the fourteenth Amendment and racial desegregation.116 
As counsel for students seeking state university funding for their 
Christian publication, McConnell successfully persuaded five justices 
of the Supreme Court to focus on the inequality in the denial of 
funding, given subsidies to other student publications.117 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected as unconstitutional the 
exclusion of a religious student newspaper from eligibility for 
funding by a state university because such exclusion amounted to 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the guarantee of 
freedom of speech.118 Similarly, it would be illegal viewpoint 
discrimination to deny access to space in the public school after the 
end of the school day to a religious after-school program.119 These 
arguments shrink concerns about government establishment of 
religion and bring religious students and their families into the 
pluralist, multicultural world created by Brown and its advocates. 
McConnell also has articulated a generous view of the 
constitutional duty to accommodate religious believers.120 
McConnell, as a law clerk for Justice William Brennan, advanced the 
view that prevailed in the Supreme Court: campus religious 
organizations cannot be denied the right of access to facilities that a 
public university grants to other organizations.121 Offering access to a 
religious group would not amount to a violation of the Establishment 
Clause because similar access would be accorded to other groups. 
Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992). This 
view should be distinguished from the conception that religion should never be treated 
differently from other personal views or commitments. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence 
Sager argue that equality would forbid the government from treating religion differently from 
any other category even if that difference takes the form of a preference or accommodation. See 
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994). 
 116. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of 
Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457 (1996). 
 117. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Transcript of Oral Arguments 
(No. 94-329), available at 1995 WL 117631. 
 118. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845. 
 119. Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).  
 120. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael 
W. McConnell, Accommodation Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 146 (1986). 
 121. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Secular?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000 (Magazine), at 40, 43–44.  
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Refusing access to a group because of its religious identity or 
message in turn would violate the Free Speech Clause by disfavoring 
one message or viewpoint.122 Therefore, a state university regulation 
that prohibited student use of school facilities for religious worship or 
preaching would violate the guarantee of freedom of speech, while an 
equal access policy would not violate the Establishment Clause. This 
is precisely how the Court summarized its decision when later 
interpreting the federal Equal Access Act123 to establish similar 
requirements for public secondary schools receiving federal funds.124 
The Court subsequently found a public school district in violation of 
the Free Speech Clause in denying a church access to school facilities 
after school hours to show a film with a religious approach to child-
rearing.125 Similarly, the Court found a school violated the Free 
Speech Clause when it denied access to a religious after-school 
program, and that such access would not violate the Establishment 
Clause.126  
McConnell testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 
favor of the general idea of a religious equality amendment that 
would allow prayer in public schools.127 Equality as well as freedom 
was at stake, in his view, and he drew an analogy to racial equality in 
defending the need to recognize the rights of individuals to exercise 
their religious beliefs without fear of discrimination or denial of 
benefits. After a court of appeals found it within the discretion of a 
ninth grade teacher to disallow a student’s proposed research paper 
on Jesus Christ, McConnell declared that he had “little doubt that the 
case would have come out the other way if a racist teacher had 
forbidden a paper on Martin Luther King, Jr., or an anticommunist 
teacher had forbidden a paper on the evils of capitalism.”128 Mindful 
of the comparison between race and religion, advocates like 
 122. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of 
Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 123. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–74.  
 124. See Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).  
 125. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 126. Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 127. Religious Freedom: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 
(1995), available at 1995 WL 11095849. 
 128. Id. (referring to Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d. 152 (6th Cir. 1995)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/3
p 11 Minnow book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board 37 
 
 
 
McConnell have successfully extended the legacy of Brown to 
religious students and schools. 
Even when it comes to public financial support for parochial 
schools, McConnell and other lawyers have effectively shifted the 
legal framework from Establishment Clause and even Free Exercise 
claims to considerations of equality and viewpoint discrimination, 
contrary to the free speech guaranty. Recasting earlier concerns about 
public funds contributing to religious activities—and leaving behind 
the 1960s and 1970s jurisprudence that incoherently sorted 
acceptable and unacceptable public aid to religious schools—the 
Supreme Court has asked instead whether the aid comes through a 
general program with neutral, secular criteria that neither benefits or 
disadvantages religion. Under such a test, the Court has upheld a 
voucher program enabling parents to select a private parochial school 
for their children,129 as well as the use of public dollars to pay for 
books, computer software, and other secular materials for use in a 
private religious school.130 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas 
cited Brown’s declaration of the importance of schooling to an 
individual’s success in life while pointing to the failing Cleveland 
schools that prompted the voucher program.131 He also stressed that 
minority and low-income parents express the strongest support for 
vouchers that enable them to select private schools for their children 
and rejected opposition as preoccupied with formalistic concerns far 
from the core purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.132  
The Court also has warned that excluding religious schools from 
generally available aid could present a violation of the Free Exercise 
clause.133 Not only is there no constitutional violation in including 
religious schools within the eligibility criteria for public funds that 
are otherwise generally available, the courts could find a 
constitutional defect if religious schools generally are excluded from 
public aid.134 Commentators expressly describe these developments 
 129. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 130. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) (rejecting Establishment 
Clause challenge because the program was generally available). 
 131. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 132. Id. at 682.  
 133. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835 n.19. 
 134. See Christopher P. Coval, Note, Good News For Religious Schools and the Freedom 
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as ending second-class treatment of religious schools.135 The 
traditional “separation of church and state” becomes unacceptably 
unequal in this light. 
The structure of this last point looks a bit like an equality 
argument, but the influence of Brown in the context of challenges to 
public aid to religious schools is even more direct. In the majority 
opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court emphasized the 
explicit justification for the voucher experiment in Milwaukee as 
improving educational opportunities for low-income minority 
children.136 In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, 
holding Justice Thurgood Marshall’s seat on the Court, stressed that 
Brown’s promise remained distant because of the deterioration and 
continuing segregation of urban schools.137 Justice Thomas embraced 
the irony that although vouchers seemed a tool to promote white 
flight at the time of Brown, nearly 50 years later, vouchers could 
open quality instruction for students otherwise trapped in failing 
public schools.138 He emphasized that minority and low-income 
parents are among the strongest supporters of voucher programs 
because they open up better educational opportunities for their 
children. But if some see the voucher case as a step toward fulfilling 
Brown’s vision of equal educational opportunities for students of 
color,139 others caution that because need may induce parents to send 
their children to religious schools, voucher programs using public 
dollars could violate the Establishment Clause or Free Exercise 
Clause.140 
of Speech, 83 B.U. L. REV. 705 (2003).  
 135. Arnold H. Loewy, The Positive Reality and Normative Virtues of a “Neutral” 
Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 533, 542–43 (2002).  
 136. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644–45. 
 137. Id. at 676–77, 682–83. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Frank J. Macchiarola, Why the Decision in Zelman Makes So Much Sense, 59 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. LAW. 459, 464–67 (2003); see also Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2002). 
 140. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at 
Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539 (2002). I have in 
the past worried that vouchers will undermine the vision of the “common school” where 
children of different backgrounds learn together, a vision predating Brown but invigorated by it. 
See, e.g., Reason, Passion, and the Progress of Law: Remembering and Advancing the 
Constitutional Vision of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101, 124 
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With advocates and courts reframing the question from aid to 
religious schools to equal treatment for religious students and 
religious ideas, Brown’s legacy may also reflect a broader 
commitment to pluralism, or perhaps the triumph of identity 
politics.141 Jeffrey Rosen puts it this way:  
Americans have always been deeply religious and deeply 
suspicious of state-imposed uniformity. In an era when 
religious identity now competes with race, sex and ethnicity as 
a central aspect of how Americans define themselves, it seems 
like discrimination—the only unforgivable sin in a 
multicultural age—to forbid people to express their religious 
beliefs in an increasingly fractured public sphere. Strict 
separationism, during its brief reign, made the mistake of 
trying to forbid not only religious expression by the state, but 
also religious expression by citizens on public property.142 
In practice, vouchers may produce more segregation by enabling 
more students to enroll in parochial schools, thereby diminishing the 
ability of public schools to serve as the meeting place for all 
students.143 Vouchers and subsidies for private schools may well 
draw Protestant students into Catholic schools and continue the 
diversificaton of the urban Catholic school that has proceeded for the 
past several decades.144 Greater accommodation of religious students 
in public schools may push in the other direction by making public 
schools more hospitable for them, but there are risks of introducing 
new forms of peer exclusion and hierarchies where religious 
activities and affiliations are divisive. An eerie mirror image of our 
paradoxes and challenges in religious accommodation rises across the 
ocean as France contemplates banning head scarves and other highly 
visible religious symbols in the public schools. This ostensible 
commitment to reinforcing the inclusive features of French 
(1999) (comments of Martha Minow). 
 141. See Martha Minow, On Being a Religious Professional: The Religious Turn in 
Professional Ethics, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 661 (2001); Rosen, supra note 121. 
 142. Rosen, supra note 121, at 45.  
 143. See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 
GOOD 89–93, 116–18 (2002). 
 144. See ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1993). 
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republican identity may not only symbolically exclude some, but may 
actually drive observant Muslim girls into self-segregated religious 
schools.  
III. ASSESSING THE LEGACIES 
There are other surprising legacies of Brown. Advocates for Roma 
children in Eastern Europe not only cite Brown, but model their 
movement for educational rights after the NAACP’s strategy.145 The 
high courts in South Africa and India have cited Brown’s principles. 
And the analogy to “separate but equal” does indeed dominate the 
current controversy over same-sex marriage and the compromise 
position of civil unions. The enormous influence of Brown probably 
cannot accurately be assessed by those of us who live in its wake, but 
I suspect that historians will look back and see how much it spread 
equality as the framework for legal, political, and social argument 
within the United States and beyond. 
But what of integration? Outside the racial context, Brown’s 
recognition that separate is inherently unequal rightly disturbs ready 
tendencies to pursue separate solutions, in schools and elsewhere, for 
girls, gays, immigrants, children with disabilities . . . and yet the 
gnawing sense persists that sometimes specialized, separate settings 
are valuable or necessary. I suggest that Brown crucially put to us the 
dual insight: (1) that educational opportunity is so crucial to any 
individual’s realistic chances of success in life that it is a right that 
must be made available to all on equal terms;146 and (2) against a 
history of mandated segregation, separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.147 
Segregation, even if so-called voluntary, should raise concerns 
over assumptions that it is better or easier and should be scoured for 
evidence that it actually promotes equal opportunity for each 
individual to have real success in life. The reasons offered for 
separate instruction differ and these differences should matter in 
 145. Interview with Angela Wu, Harvard law student (July 16, 2004). 
 146. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 147. Id. at 495. 
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resolving doubts about its particular use. Thus, for some children 
with disabilities, and for adolescents who have recently arrived in the 
United States with little or no formal schooling, separate instruction 
seems crucial in order to provide the content appropriate to the 
students’ needs. The activities of the regular classroom are simply too 
remote from where these students are, at least for a time, to provide 
meaningful educational opportunities. For some girls and for some 
boys, separate instruction may reduce distractions and create an ethos 
of achievement that boosts learning. Perhaps this is also true for some 
students in majority-minority schools, although arguments about their 
ethos often seem to reflect the lack of realistic chances for 
integration. Researchers continue to find evidence of higher student 
achievement for students of color who attend integrated schools.148 
For some gay and lesbian teens, separate instruction seems crucial 
for protection from harassment, hatred, and violence. Separate 
instruction for them seems almost a desperate response to 
inhospitable and dangerous settings, but also a concession to the 
negative attitudes and behaviors of others that could, and should, be 
challenged and changed. Here, it is important to consider how much 
changing those attitudes and behaviors depends upon tackling the 
assumption that separate settings are safer and are acceptable. 
In scrutinizing contemporary uses of separate instruction, we 
should return to Brown. The Supreme Court’s decision fundamentally 
represented recognition that the entire community is affected by the 
treatment of any of its members. Hannah Arendt, Holocaust refugee 
and political theorist, initially did not understand much of this and 
wrote a controversial critique of President Eisenhower’s use of 
federal troops to enforce the token desegregation of Little Rock’s 
Central High School.149 Reflecting on her own experience with 
Nazism, Arendt worried about the loss of a private right of freedom 
of association, cautioned against Black demands for social equality 
given the risks to more fundamental rule of law, and warned about 
the forced participation of children to lead social and political 
changes sought by adults.150  
 148. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 9, at 22–26. 
 149. Hannah Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, 6 DISSENT 45 (1959). 
 150. Id. 
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Ralph Ellison challenged Arendt and told her that she did not 
understand the role of school children in the struggle for racial 
desegregation as initiation into a racist world—and also part of an 
African-American tradition of self-sacrifice.151 At least in reply, 
Arendt acknowledged that she had not fully understood the 
situation.152 The issue of sacrifice deserves more attention in today’s 
segregative and integrative debates for the variety of students I have 
discussed; perhaps we have fallen too quickly into a view of children 
as vulnerable, and neglected not only their resilience but also how 
much strength they may find in tackling social problems with adults 
on their side. 
Even before her change of heart, Arendt wrote that, given the lack 
of a common past or homogeneous population in the United States, 
the very survival of the United States would depend upon “‘its all-
comprehensive, typically American form [of] equality [which] 
possesses an enormous power to equalize what by nature and origin 
is different.’”153 Discerning precisely how to realize this potential 
remains our challenge today. Race, ethnicity, language, disability, 
gender, citizenship, sexual orientation, religion—none of these 
should interfere with an individual student’s equal chance to learn. 
But what should this mean for us? The surprising legacies of Brown 
must make this the question for us all. 
 151. See ELIZABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD 316 
(1982).  
 152. Id.  
 153. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School Desegregation 
Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1582 n.507 (1990) (quoting Arendt, supra note 149, at 
47–48). 
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